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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-EXTENT 
OF DISCRETION EXERCISED BY DISTRICT COURTS IN ISSUING TEMPO-
RARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES-
The Labor-Management Relations Act1 gives federal district 
courts jurisdiction to grant injunctions in two different situations, 
notwithstanding the general policy against granting in junctions 
in labor disputes not involving fraud or violence set by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.2 The grant of limited injunctive jurisdiction given 
by section 2083 in one situation, national emergencies, will not be 
discussed. This comment will deal only with the other, the grant 
of jurisdiction in sections 10(j) and (l)4 to enjoin alleged unfair 
labor practices at the request of the National Labor Relations 
Board's regional officer, pending a disposition of the charges by 
the Board. This jurisdiction may be invoked whenever the dis-
trict court deems such relief "just and proper," and this phrase 
can be as crucial to the outcome of a labor dispute as it is vague 
as a standard for issuing the in junction. The purpose of this com-
161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141 to §159. 
2 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §101 to §115. 
8 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §178. 
'61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §1600), (l). 
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ment is therefore to examine the facts which a court will require 
before it deems injunctive relief "just and proper." 
I 
The act's provisions for district court injunctions depart from 
the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Act5 policy of avoiding injunc-
tions, which have long been an anathema to labor organizations 
as a weapon in labor disputes.6 The act's proponents in Congress 
deemed injunctive jurisdiction necessary in view of the problem 
of time-consuming Board procedures in an area where "time is 
usually of the essence .... "7 Injunctions, when issued, are effective 
only until the Board has ruled on the charges.8 The Board remains 
the exclusive arbiter of unfair labor practice charges9 subject 
to court of appeals review, and the district courts in injunction 
proceedings do not purport to make a final determination on the 
merits. 
The congressional proponents spoke of the injunctive remedies 
as being necessary to protect the public interest, not to vindicate 
private rights.10 In this connection, it now seems settled that only 
the Board through its regional officer,11 and not private parties, 
can obtain such injunctive relief from the district courts.12 But, 
as pointed out by Justice Jackson in Garner v. Teamsters Union13 
in another context, there is no clear distinction between "public" 
5 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
6 LeBaron v. Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union, (S.D. Cal. 1948) 75 
F. Supp. 678 at 681, affd. (9th Cir. 1949) 171 F. (2d) 331, cert. den. 336 U.S. 949 (1949). 
See "The Labor Management Relations Act and the Revival of the Labor Injunction," 
48 COL. L. REv. 759 (1948). Cf. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). 
7 S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1947). 
8 See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 489 (1953). 
9 See Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, (4th Cir. 1948) 
167 F. (2d) 183. 
10 " ••• [T)he Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely 
private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor practices 
and . . • shall also seek such relief in the case of strikes and boyi:otts defined as unfair 
labor practices." S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1947). 
11 Section 100) grants power to petition for temporary relief to the "Board," while 
§lO(l) provides for petitions by the regional officer or attorney. The regional officer or 
attorney is in fact the petitioner under both sections, however, the Board having dele• 
gated this function to him. See NLRB Statement of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. (1956 Supp.) 
§101.32. This delegation was upheld in Evans v. International Typographical Union, 
(S.D. Ind. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 881. 
12 Food Basket v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, (W.D. Ky. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 463. If 
a private party obtains an injunction in a state court, however, federal district courts have 
no jurisdiction to enjoin the state proceedings [Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Ameri. 
ca v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511 (1955)] unless the Board has taken cognizance of 
the charges: Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954); NLRB v. Swift & Co., 
(8th Cir. 1956) 233 F. {2d) 226. 
13 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 
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and "private" rights, particularly in this area where "free flow of 
commerce" is postulated as the public good, and where almost 
any economic activity is deemed to "affect commerce" within the 
meaning of the act.14 Since the impetus for Board action must 
come from a private party who charges that an unfair labor prac-
tice has been committed, and since the charging party is allowed 
to present evidence at court hearings on petitions for an injunc-
tion,15 it is probable that the "public rights" at issue in injunction 
proceedings find their strongest advocates in private disputants 
acting in their own interests. In fact, it will be seen that the statu-
tory scheme goes far to render the Board an automaton as to sec-
tion 10 (l) petitions. 
Before examining the courts' approaches to the act's "just and 
proper" standard for relief, some aspects of the procedural setting 
of sections 10 (j) and (l) should at least be mentioned. Section 
1 o (j) arms the Board's regional officer with power to petition for 
a temporary injunction against any unfair labor practice, whether 
committed by employer or union, but only "upon issuance of a 
complaint."16 The regional officer _is under no compulsion to file 
such a petition, and in practice they are rare. Only twenty-eight 
have been filed during the first nine and one half years of the act's 
operation, and eight of these were withdrawn before court ac-
tion.17 It is apparent that the section 10 (j) petition is being util-
ized as an extraordinary remedy after strict administrative screen-
ing. So utilized, such petitions have been granted in all but two 
cases.18 
Section 10 (l) makes it mandatory for the regional officer to 
petition for an injunction whenever a violation of section 8 (b) 
(4) (A), (B), or (C) is charged (secondary boycotts, sympathy 
strikes, and attempts by one union to compel recognition as bar-
14 See Shore v. Building & Construction Trades Council, (3d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 
678; 8 A.L.R. (2d) 731 (1949); Slater v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 
(10th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 608. 
15 See Douds v. Wine, Liquor ~ Distillery Workers Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 75 F. 
Supp. 447. 
16 See Jaffee v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 443. 
17 A letter from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB discloses this as 
well as the further fact that §IO(j) petitions are sought in less than 1 % of cases where 
complaints are filed. 
18 Brown v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., (N.D. Cal. 1954) 26 CCH LAB. CAs. 
1f68,549 (employer agreed to preserve status quo by recognizing certified bargaining 
representative in two-week interval before Board hearing); Graham v. Boeing Airplane 
Co., (W.D. Wash. 1948) 15 CCH LAB. CAS. lf64,604 (employer not obliged to bargain with 
union which had lost status under the act by striking without 60-day notice). 
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gaining representative when another has been certified). The sec-
tion also empowers him to file such a petition, if appropriate,19 
after a charge of violation of section 8 (b)(4) (D) (jurisdictional dis-
putes).20 The mandatory nature of 10 (l) petitions has made them 
much more common than their discretionary counterparts under 
section 10 (j).21 Under section 10 (l) the request for an injunction 
is made before any complaint is ever issued, but the regional officer 
must make a preliminary investigation22 sufficient to satisfy him-
self that there is "reasonable cause to believe such charge is true 
and that ·a complaint should issue." Under the statutory mandate 
there is no opportunity for screening by the regional officer with 
a view toward inquiring whether or not injunctive relief is 
necessary or desirable; he can refrain from seeking the injunction 
only if he concludes that no complaint should issue.23 
II 
To what extent does the act leave the courts free to apply 
traditional equitable principles in granting or denying relief? 
Arguing from the apparent carte blanche conferred by the statute 
upon the court to grant "such relief as it deems just and proper," 
some of the cases denying injunctions expressly announce that 
usual equitable principles are applicable.24 The more general at-
titude, however, has been that: "The relief provided is entirely 
statutory. The common law requirements do not apply. The statu-
10 The act contemplates that jurisdictional disputes underlying §8(b) (4) (D) charges 
will be settled quickly by the Board pursuant to §I0(k), making a preliminary injunction 
unnecessary in most cases. See Herzog v. Parsons, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 781. 
20 Notice must be given to respondents under both subsections G) and (l), except 
that subsection (l) gives the court jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order, 
good for no more than five days, without any prior notice to respondent, upon an al-
legation that "substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoid-
able" without such relief. For principles governing the granting of temporary restrain-
ing orders, see NLRB, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 88 (1948). 
21 From the employer's viewpoint, the provision for mandatory petition puts a 
premium on framing charges that will fall within §8(b) (4). See remarks of (then) Gen-
eral Counsel Denham, NLRB Release of Sept. 23, 1947, at 15, 16. 
22 As to the type of preliminary investigation required, see LeBaron v. Kern County 
Farm Labor Union, (S.D. Cal. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 151 at 157, 158. As to procedure followed 
by the regional officer under §l0G) and (l), see 29 C.F.R. (1956 Supp.) §§101.32, 101.33. 
23 It is interesting to note that under §lO(l), the regional officer would seem to have 
discretion to refrain from filing a petition if he concludes that a complaint should not 
issue pursuant to the charges. Under §3(d), the courts cannot order the issuance of a 
complaint. Hourihan v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 187, cert. den. 345 U.S. 930 
(1953). 
24 Elliott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, (W.D. Mo. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 690, app. dis-
missed (8th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 965; Sperry v. Denver Building &: Construction Trades 
Council, (D.C. Col. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 321; Humphrey v. Local 294, Teamsters, (N.D. 
N.Y. 1950) 17 CCH LAB. CAS. 1f65,539. 
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tory scheme is complete in itself."25 The courts typically limit 
themselves to the narrower inquiry of whether there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the union is committing the unfair labor 
practice, granting injunctive relief upon a finding of reasonable 
cause without any further balancing of interests. 
A. "Reasonable Cause To Believe" as the Test 
for an Injunction 
A finding by the district court that there is reasonable cause to 
believe an unfair labor practice has been or is being committed as 
charged clearly is a sine qua non for injunctive relief. Most cases 
denying relief do so on the ground that there is no such reason-
able cause.26 It is proper, however, to inquire whether this is or 
should be the exclusive test for injunctive relief. 
The only suggestion of such a limited test that can be gleaned 
from the statute itself appears in section 10 (l), where the regional 
officer is directed to petition £or injunctive relief if he feels there 
is reasonable cause to believe the charges are true. The statutory 
test for actµal issuance of the injunction is the same in both sub-
sections (j) and (l)-such relief as the court "deems just and 
proper." Yet there is definite language in a number of cases limit-
ing the scope of inquiry to a mere review of whether the regional 
officer had such reasonable cause. Thus, the recent case of Le Bus 
v. Locals 406, etc., Operating Engineers21 states: 
"It may well be ... that these facts do not demonstrate a 
violation of Subsection (4) (A) and (B) of Section 8 (b) of the 
Act. But it is not necessary for this court to make that de-
termination. Since the facts here clearly demonstrate that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Act 
may have been committed, it is the duty of this court to main-
tain the status quo by enjoining the questioned activity until 
its legality can be definitively passed on by the exercise of the 
expertise of the National Labor Relations Board .... This 
court's statutory authority is exhausted when it finds, as it 
does, that on the showing made here, the evidence points in 
the direction of illegality." 
25 Douds v. Local 294, Teamsters, (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 414 at 418. See also 
Douds v. Anheuser-Busch, (D.C. N.J. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 474. 
26 See, e.g., Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 75 F. 
Supp. 672; Douds v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union, 
(2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 49. 
27 (E.D. La. 1956) 145 F. Supp. 316 at 321, 322. See the same language used by the 
same court in 1-eBus v. General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, (E.D. La. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 
673 at 677. 
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The injunctive function under the act has been analogized to "the 
historic function of the grand jury, where it must determine prob-
able cause for a man to be tried." Such a determination compels 
a "stopgap" injunction pending Board determination of the mer-
its.28 There are also a great many cases in which an injunction was 
granted without any grounds other than the existence of reason-
able cause being offered, although the court used no express lan-
guage to limit the scope of the inquiry.29 One early and much 
cited case, however, Douds v. Local 294, Teamsters,30 while grant-
ing an injunction on a prima facie showing, recognized that the 
mandate in section 10 (Z) to petition for relief is "not the measure 
of the proof required before this court may grant such relief." 
The court mentioned that "the purpose of the statute and interests 
involved in its enforcement" must be considered. Nevertheless, a 
fair summary of the majority of cases would be that the statutory 
test of "just and proper" is satisfied whenever the court agrees that 
the regional officer had reasonable cause to believe that the unfair 
labor practice charges were true. This approach was carried to its 
logical conclusion in Roumell v. United Association of]. and A.31 
where the court in granting an in junction made the following 
statement: "All that is before this Court for decision is whether or 
not there is reasonable cause to believe that the conduct of re-
spondents here constitutes an unfair labor practice as it is spelled 
out in §8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. If there is injustice in applying the 
statute to this situation the remedy is not in the courts. . . ." 
Therefore, despite the fact that the court is authorized to grant 
28 Consentino v. International Longshoremen's Assn., (D.C. Puerto Rico 1954) 126 
F. Supp. 420 at 423. Other cases expressly limiting the inquiry to "reasonable cause to 
believe" (often expressed as a "prima facie case'): Douds v. Confectionery and Tobacco 
Jobbers Employees Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 191 at 196; Styles v. Local 760, 
IBEW, (E.D. Tenn. 1948) 80 F. Supp. ll9 at 122; LeBaron v. Kern County Farm Labor 
Union, (S.D. Cal. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 151 at 158; Jaffee v. Henry Heide, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 
1953) ll5 F. Supp. 52 at 57 [§IO(j) petition]; Sperry v. Building Material &: Construction, 
(D.C. Neb. 1956) 149 F. Supp. 243. Cf. LeBus v. International Woodworkers of America, 
(M.D. Ala. 1956) 142 F. Supp. 875; Douds v. Business Machine &: Office Appliance M~ 
chanics Conference Board, Local 459, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 43; Yager v. Inter• 
national Union of Operating Engineers, Local 12, (S.D. Cal. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 362. 
20 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Teamsters, Local 688, (E.D. Mo. 1956) 29 CCH LAB. CAs. 
1[69,812; Douds v. Bonnaz, Hand Embroiderers, Local 66, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 
919; Madden v. General Teamsters, Local 126, (E.D. Wis. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 459; Douds 
v. Knit Goods Workers, (E.D. N.Y. 1954) 27 CCH LAB. CAs. 1[68,802; Irving v. Carpenters 
Local 12, (N.D. N.Y. 1953) 24 CCH LAB. CAs. 1[67,890; Shore v. General Teamsters, (W.D. 
Pa. 1950) 18 CCH LAB. CAs. 1[65,684; McMahon v. Local 600, Truck Drivers, (E.D. Mo. 
1953) 123 F. Supp. 303. 
ao (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 414 at 418-419. 
S1 (E.D. Mich. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 706 at 708. 
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only such relief as it deems "just and proper," it here refused to 
consider alleged "injustice" in making its determination. 
This approach may be defended on the basis that Congress 
strongly disapproved of secondary boycotts, etc., violating section 
8 (b)(4), and showed this by making the petition for injunctive 
_relief in such cases mandatory.32 Such a reading of legislative 
policy is expressed in Le Baron v. Printing Specialties and Paper 
Converters Union.33 However, the tendency to grant injunctions. 
upon a finding of reasonable cause (or a prima facie case) has also 
appeared in some section 1 o (j) cases,3'1 even though the argument 
of special congressional disapproval of particular unfair labor 
· practices involved, present in section 10 (l) cases, is not available. 
· In most section 10 (j) cases, however, the court actually in-
quires into the relative need for an in junction, discussing whether 
irreparable injury to the public and the charging party would en-
. sue if the injunction. were denied. The greater incidence of such 
inquiry in these cases may be due to the fact, already mentioned, 
that section 10 (j) petitions are filed in less than one percent of 
unfair labor practice cases. Typically, they have been filed only 
where some emergency is involved, such as the coal mining crises 
of 1948 and 1950,35 a serious threat of widespread unemployment 
in Puerto Rico,-sa a threat to publication of newspapers throughout 
the nation,37 or the threat of a coastal shipping tie-up.38 
Courts which look only to "reasonable cause" as a basis for 
granting injunctive relief are not completely agreed on the mean-
ing of that elastic term. Thus a court may recognize a strong pos-
sibility that no unfair labor practice was committed, but may yet 
find "reasonable cause" if "the evidence points in the direction of 
82 S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8, 27 (1947). 
83 (S.D. Cal. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 678, affd. (9th Cir. 1949) 171 F. (2d) 331, cert. den. 
ll36 U.S. 949 (1949) 
84 Jaffee v. Henry Heide, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 52 at 57. Cf. Douds v. 
· ILA Independent, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 147 F. Supp. 103. Such a test for §lO(j) injunctions, 
if consistently followed, would in effect put it in the regional officer's power to bring 
about an injunction against any unfair labor practice. In practice, §lO(j) petitions have 
been rare. See note 17 supra. 
85 Madden v. International Union, UMW, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 616; Penello 
v. International Union, UMW, (D.C. D.C. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 935. 
86 Curry v. Union de Trabajadores de la Industria, (D.C. Puerto Rico 1949) 86 F. 
Supp. 707. 
87 Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 881. 
8SDouds v. ILA Independent, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 147 F. Supp. 103. Cf. Brown v. Na-
tional Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, (N.D. Cal. 1951) 104 F. Supp. 685, granting 
a §lO(j) injunction on facts short of dire public necessity, but stressing that an injunction 
is not a mere matter of course. 
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illegality," as in the Operating Engineers case quoted above. On 
the other hand, a court may construe "reasonable cause to believe" 
more strictly, as did Judge Wyzanski in Alpert v. United Steel-· 
workers of America, AFL-GI0:30 " ••• I cannot say that a Court 
such as this is persuaded that it is reasonable to believe that, if the 
facts as finally developed by the Board coincide precisely with the, 
facts as developed here, the Board would order, or the Court [ of 
Appeals] would sustain an order directing, the Union to desist .... ". 
Even more stringent was the language in Douds v. Local 50, 
Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union: 40 "The. 
issuance of a preliminary injunction is a drastic step which should 
not lightly be undertaken, and in the absence of some clear proof 
that the respondent has sought to induce or encourage the employ-
ees [in violation of section 8 (b) (4)(C)], the preliminary injunc-
tion must be denied." The uncertain meaning of "reasonable 
cause" has received judicial comment,u and it is possible that 
equitable factors are subconsciously considered by a judge in de-
termining what facts are sufficient to show "reasonable cause." 
B. Gases Recognizing Discretion Beyond "Reasonable 
Gause To Believe" 
A number of cases do expressly mention the existence of dis-
cretion in the district court to determine whether or not an injunc-
tion would be "just and proper," assuming that there is cause to 
believe the unfair labor practice charges true. Some courts merely 
advert to such discretion and then grant the injunction almost 
automatically, with little or no actual weighing of interests and 
policies.42 Regardless of whether or not such inquiry is made, it 
has become a standard formality for a great many courts to ·in-
clude a sentence under their conclusions of law reproducing or'. 
patterned after Judge Swygert's language in Evans v. International 
Typographical Union:43 "To preserve the issues presented for 
their orderly determination by the Board as provided in the Act, 
and to avoid irreparable in jury to the interests of the public, em-
39 (D.C. Mass. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 447 at 453. 
40 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 127 F. Supp. 534 at 537, affd. (2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 49. 
H Brown v. Retail Shoe & Textile Salesmen's Union, (N.D. Cal. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 
207 at 210. 
42 See, e.g., Douds v. New York Local Union 10, Production, Maintenance and Op· 
erating Employees, (E.D. N.Y. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 221. 
43 (S.D. Ind. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 881 at 894. 
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ployees, and employers, it is appropriate, just, and proper that, 
pending final adjudication by the Board [an injunction should 
be issued]." 
Other courts, however, have undertaken to weigh the facts,44 
following the view expressed by the Tenth Circuit:45 "It is not 
the inflexible duty of the court in every case of this kind to grant 
a temporary injunction to remain in force and effect until the 
Board makes its final adjudication .... The court has a reasonable 
permissive range for the exercise of its discretion in the granting 
of injunctive relief appropriate to the particular circumstances 
presented, or in withholding its writ." 
If the district courts are to exercise a discretion more compre-
hensive than reviewing the reasonable cause to believe that an 
unfair labor practice has been committed, two factors mentioned 
by the courts should be explored. A great deal of language appears 
in the cases to the effect that section 1 o U) and ( l) in junctions 
have the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the interval 
before the Board can make final disposition of the charges.40 De-
spite the popularity of this language, it is difficult to gain mucq. 
aid from it in assessing whether an injunction should or should 
not be granted. The fact is that labor disputes are fluid and may 
involve constantly changing relationships. As of what time should 
the status be frozen by injunction? To say that the "status" ex-
isting between the disputants does not include the particular 
mode of exerting pressure upon which the unfair labor prac-
tice is based is to use a mere verbal cover for the conclusion 
44 Douds v. International Longshoremen's Assn., (E.D. N.Y. 1956) 31 CCH LAB. CAs. 
1J70,162; Douds v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 
447; Douds v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 680, (D.C. N.J. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 
336; Brown v. Retail Shoe & Textile Salesmen's Union, (N.D. Cal. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 207; 
Styles v. Local 74, Carpenters, (E.D. Tenn. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 499 (controversy moot); 
note 24 infra. 
45 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, (10th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 863 at 
869. In affirming the injunction, which had been granted under the belief that the Board 
would act within two months, the court at p. 869 invited the district court on remand 
to determine whether the injunction should be perpetuated in view of the fact that ten 
months had already elapsed without Board action. 
46 "Since the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible for 
persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed un-
der any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or 
preserve the status quo pending litigation." S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 27 (1947). 
See Schauffier v. United Assn. of Journeymen, Local 420, (3d Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 476; 
Brown v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, (N.D. Cal. 1951) 104 F. Supp. 
685; Building & Construction Trades Council v. LeBaron, (9th Cir. 1949) 181 F. (2d) 449 
(denying motion to suspend district court's injunction pending appeal). · 
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that the actual status should be changed by removing such pres-
sure until the Board can decide the case. If it is urged that the 
pressure may be so drastically effective that one side must surren-
der in the dispute before the Board has had a chance to decide 
whether the practice is improper, it should also be recognized 
that the other side may have this same advantage after the injunc-
tion has been granted.47 This is particularly true in view of the 
long period of time sometimes required by the Board to decide a 
case.48 In any event, before granting an injunction, it should at 
least be considered that an in junction does more to alter the 
"status quo" for one side's benefit than to maintain it. In one in-
teresting case the court dismissed a section 1 o ( l) petition to en-
join a union from fining its members who were employees of 
secondary parties for handling goods of the primary employer-dis-
putant, despite a clear violation of section 8 (b) (4) (B). The 
grounds given were that an injunction would not really maintain 
the status quo because individual union members could and 
would voluntarily refrain from handling such goods.49 Normally, 
however, merely announcing a purpose to maintain the status quo 
would not seem to take one very far toward deciding whether or 
not an injunction is merited. 
The traditional equitable requirement of a showing that ir-
reparable injury will ensue without an injunction, which persists 
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,50 appears in the present statutory 
scheme only in connection with temporary ex parte restraining 
orders under section 10 (l). Therefore, its absence as an express 
requirement for the principal injunctions under both subsections 
(j) and (l) would seem to negate any such prerequisite, particu-
larly since "the statutory scheme is complete in itself."51 It should 
be noted that this lone reference in the ex parte injunction provi-
sion is to irreparable injury to the charging party, underscoring 
47 For instance, in an alleged secondary boycott situation, if the injunction is not 
granted, the contractor may be required to procure materials from a supplier to whom 
the union does not object before the Board can pass on the question. Conversely, if an 
injunction is granted, the contractor may finish the project using materials furnished by 
the objectionable supplier before the Board has been able to determine whether the 
union in fact violated §B(b) (4) (A). 
48 For criticism of the Board in this regard, see Douds v. Wood, Wire and Metal 
Lathers International Assn., (3d Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 223, note 45 supra. 
49 Elliott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, (W.D. Mo. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 690, app. dis-
missed (8th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 965. 
50 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §101 to §115 (1952). 
51 See note 25 supra. 
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the point made above that the "public rights" vindicated under 
the act can assume distinctly private dimensions. 52 
These two factors, then, cannot properly be considered in 
granting an in junction, and the court is left to balance the in-
terests of the alleged violator on the one hand with the public on 
the other. It would appear doubtful that a circuit court would 
disturb a district court finding, based on a weighing of conflicting 
interests, that injunctive relief was not "just and proper." The 
scope of review would seem to be limited to determining whether 
the refusal to grant relief was a proper exercise of judicial discre-
tion. 53 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, in reversing a district 
judge's refusal to grant a section 10 U) injunction because he er-
roneously found no "reasonable cause," cast some doubt on the 
use of usual equitable principles in denying injunctive relief.54 
Moreover, in Douds v. International Longshoremen's Assn.55 the 
Second Circuit reversed a discretionary refusal to grant a section 
10 (l) injunction. Judge Medina, speaking for the court, found 
that the district judge's admonition that the parties should have ar-
bitrated their disagreement was a "mere diversion," and further 
stated:56 "It was not for the District Court to pass upon the 'public 
interest or necessity.' These matters had already been decided by 
Congress when it passed the Act.'' This appears to miss the point. 
While Congress did forbid certain unfair labor practices as against 
the public interest, it nevertheless left it to the district courts to 
provide only that relief deemed "just and proper" as to parties 
who were only reasonably believed to have violated the act. The 
Second Circuit notwithstanding, it is difficult to see how this can 
be done without exercising discretion according to some rational 
standard which takes account of factors in addition to the prob-
ability that the statute is being violated. 
52 See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 489 (1953), where Justice Jackson 
speaks of the Board's power under §lO(j) " ... to seek from the United States District 
Court an injunction to prevent irreparable injury to petitioners [the private employer] 
while their case was being considered .... " Emphasis supplied. 
63 See Schauffier v. Highway Truck Drivers &: Helpers, (3d Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 
7 at 9, where Judge Goodrich stated that as to a case where an injunction was granted 
below, the scope of review was limited to determining whether "the finding of a rea-
sonable cause is not clearly erroneous under 52 (a), Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C., 
and whether the form of relief granted shows a proper exercise of judicial discretion." 
64 Brown v. Pacific Telephone &: Telegraph Co., (9th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 542 at 
544, 545. In Slater v. Denver Building &: Construction Trades Council, (10th Cir. 1949) 
175 F. (2d) 608, a refusal to grant a IO(l) injunction was reversed on the grounds, however, 
that the district judge had erroneously found interstate commerce not to be affected. 
55 (2d Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 809, reversing (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 31 CCH LAB. CAs. ff70,162. 
56 242 F. (2d) at 811, 812. 
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C. Public Interest as a Requirement 
Interests of the public at large-perhaps more realistically 
described in most labor disputes as interests of the community in-
volved-are always legitimate considerations in the exercise of eq-
uitable powers. Where present, elements of public interest and/or 
statutory policy may well encourage injunctive relief, as pointed 
out by the Supreme Court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles in reviewing 
a denial of an injunction under the Emergency Price Control Act 
of 1942: "The Administrator does not carry the sole burden of 
the war against inflation. The courts also have been entrusted 
with a share of that respons~bility. And their discretion under 
§205 (a) must be exercised in light of the large objectives of the 
Act. For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements 
of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunc-
tive relief in these cases."57 It is equally pertinent to the present 
discussion that the Court in the Hecht case held that the district 
courts retained traditional equitable discretion to balance interests 
and to deny injunctive relief, despite statutory language making 
a much stronger case for mandatory relief than the act's "just and 
proper" clause. The Hecht case has been cited in several proceed-
ings under section 10 (j) and (l), and was relied on by the district 
court in the case later reversed by the Second Circuit. 
Only one other reported case actually relying on the absence 
of public interest factors in denying injunctive relief has been 
found58 which was not rendered moot by the time the petition 
was filed.59 Other cases have announced that public interest fac-
57 321 U.S. 321 at 331 (1944). 
58 Douds v. Local 24368, United Wire & Metal Workers Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1949) 86 
F. Supp. 542. The charging party was a manufacturer under contract to supply orna-
mental sink fronts for a public State Island housing project during a housing shortage. 
When a union attempted to assign its status as certified bargaining representative to 
respondent union, the manufacturer refused to bargain with respondent, whereupon a 
strike and picketing ensued. The court recognized that representative status was not 
assignable and that respondent was violating §8(b) (4) (C), .but said, at p. 545, that an 
injunction "would be neither just nor proper" because the ornamental sink fronts were 
not essential to the housing project, and because the Board had failed to settle the 
representation question promptly, despite the "ample facilities at its command" to do so. 
Graham v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weaving District Council, (W.D. Wash. 1952), 
discussed briefly in NLRB, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 267 (1952), but otherwise unre-
ported, denied relief on grounds of absence of substantial public interest where few em-
ployees were affected and no interruption of business or employment was shown. See also 
NLRB, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 150 (1954). 
59 A number of cases where relief was denied and public interest was mentioned 
involved violations that were mooted, e.g., Douds v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers 
Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 447, or that appeared unlikely to recur. Some of 
the latter situations were retained on the court docket for reopening if violations re-
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tors would be considered in rendering a decision, but in all the 
requisite public interest in granting the injunction was found. 
Illustrative of these is Le Baron v. Los Angeles Building & Con-
struction Trades Council,60 where Judge Yankwich emphasized 
that the district court's discretion remained even after reasonable 
cause to believe the charges true was found, and further remarked: 
" ... [T]he inquiry in a particular case should be whether 
the public good will be served by using its [the act's] coer-
cive powers. That calls for a balancing of interests, in the 
light of the social aims to be attained. Courts should, and do, 
hesitate to issue temporary injunctions pending the final de-
termination of a lawsuit, when such action would, in effect, 
settle the controversy. Here, the issuance of the injunction 
would not mean such determination .... " 
The court mentioned the public consequences of holding up con-
struction of a giant turbine, involving hundreds of workers, at a 
time of power shortage in southern California. 
Conclusion 
A demonstrated existence of "public interest" factors, beyond 
facts bringing the case within the commerce requirements of the 
act and estaqlishing the probability of a violation, is not considered 
a prerequisite to an injunction under section 10 (l) petitions in 
most cases. Such a requirement has been imposed, however, in a 
few cases, and the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue. It 
is submitted that such factors are pertinent to the court's exercise 
of discretion, and that a court can determine if injunctive relief is 
truly "just and proper" only after such a consideration. The 
stronger tendency to weigh public interest factors in section 1 o U) 
proceedings provides an example which should be followed under 
section 1 o ( l). 
John A. Beach, S. Ed. 
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